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WHOSE MONEY IS IT?

ProfessorAmy Ellen Schwartz
PROF. SCHWARTZ: I hope that it is a provocative question.
I want to talk about this question because answering it is fundamental
to making equitable, efficient tax policy. More specifically, my
question is: how do we apportion household earnings among the
various household members into taxable incomes and associated tax
units? Put simply, that is, "Whose money is it?"
This is not a new question. In fact, it is an old question that
was debated and discussed in great depth for years, revolving around
the issue of income splitting between married couples in the days of
separate filing.20 In those days, married couples with a single earner
sought to allocate, through a private contract, a portion of the single
earner's income - typically the husband - to the non-earner spouse
typically the wife - in order to take advantage of the lower rates
-

faced by the non-earner.21 In 1930, the Supreme Court held in Lucas
v. Earl that taxpayers could not split their income in this way for tax
purposes. 22 However, in a decision later that year, Poe v. Seaborn,
they allowed famiiies residing in. states with community property laws
to report split income. 23 Then, in 1948, Congress reformed the
Federal Income Tax, extending this option to all taxpayers in all
24

states.

Now, an important part of the discussion in those days
revolved around the question of who "owned" the income. In Taxing
20 See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and

Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241, 255-56, 282-87
(1997) (explaining the mechanics of income-shifting).
21 See id. at 254-57; see also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930)
(involving a husband and wife who entered into such a contract).
22 281 U.S. at 114-15 (holding that because the husband earned the income,
he could not impute by contract any portion thereof to his wife for tax purposes).
23 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (distinguishing this case from Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111).
24Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, tit. I1, pt. I, 62 Stat. 110, 114-
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Women, Ed McCaffrey quotes California's then Representative,
Bertrand Gearhart, as saying:
We tax the individual's income. If, in your state, you
want to insist that that income belongs to the husband
and that the wife has no interest in it at all, logically he
should pay the tax on it. In our state, the State of
California, the husband never was regarded and is not
treated as the owner of all of that income. From the
instant that it is earned, according to the law of the
state, it became and was the property of the
community partnership.
The wife owns half, the
25
husband owns half.
At the same time, others argued that since a married couple
acts as a single economic unit, it should be taxed as a single economic
unit. 26 Although I doubt that the protagonists in these debates had
anticipated it, economists have spent some significant effort in the last
50 years investigating the validity of two of the underlying claims
made. 27 The first is that married couples act as a single economic unit
that is, as if it is all "our" money. The second is that married
couples act as if income earned by a family is half his and half hers.
These are not, in fact, the same things.
Economic theory has offered essentially two views of the
married couple as economic agents.
The traditional common
preference models' view is that families pool all their resources and
make consumption decisions as if they were maximizing a single
objective function. This is consistent with the it's-all-ours story. The
implication of the pooling of resources in a family is that family
expenditure decisions should not depend on who earns the money and
married couples should be taxed as a single unit.
The alternative models regard joint family decisions as
25See EDWARD J. MCCAFFREY, TAXING WOMEN 53 (1997).
26

See Marjorie E. Komhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership

Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1413, 1436-37
(1996) (explaining the rationale behind taxing married couples as a single economic unit).
27 See id. at 1431-50 (stating that spouses should be taxed separately); see
also Christian, supra note 20, at 265-79 (comparing the effects of income splitting and
income aggregation).
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growing out of bargaining between husbands and wives. These are
husbands and wives who sometimes have divergent interests that are
framed by social institutions and norms governing marriage and
divorce and, most importantly, are influenced by their individual
economic circumstances. This means that these models predict that
family expenditure decisions may depend on who earns it and who
controls the money. This carries the implication that husbands and
wives should be treated as distinct economic units for tax purposes.
It turns out that it is quite difficult to empirically distinguish
between these models. I could talk a long time about that but I won't.
Instead, what I will talk about is that there seems to be mounting
evidence that family consumption decisions do depend upon the
distribution of earnings between the husband and the wife. In some
pretty conclusive evidence, Lundberg, Pollack and Wales show that
when the United Kingdom began remitting.their substantial child
benefit allowance directly to mothers rather than as supplements to
fathers' paychecks, spending on children's clothing rose by an average
of £50 and spending on mothers' clothing rose by an average of £40
for an average two-child family receiving a child allowance of about
£500.28 The point is, simply, that switching to direct payments to the
mother from payments to the father caused significant changes in
what the money was spent on.
More generally and looking at a broader range of evidence,
spending on a wide range of goods and services changes as the share
of income earned by the wife increases. As an example, when this
occurs, spending on restaurant meals and childcare increases;
spending on alcohol and tobacco decreases. 29 The implication for tax
policy is that while the evidence may not be fully conclusive, there is
significant evidence that husbands and wives do not ignore the source
of the income in making economic decisions. That means that it may
be inappropriate to view them as a single economic unit.
There is another issue that we need to address. Our treatment
28

See Shelly J. Lundberg et al., Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their

Resources? Evidencefrom U.K. Child Benefit, 32 J. HuM. REs. 463 (1997).
29 Cf Peter
D. Brandon, Income-Pooling Arrangements, Economic
Constraints, and Married Mothers' Child Care Choices, J. FAM. ISSUES, May 1, 1999 at
350 (reporting that a wife's abilities to participate in childcare payments is key to choice
of childcare).
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of the household is inconsistent in light of the many different types of
household structures we have today in the United States. The
differential treatment of couples depending on their marital status
raises serious issues about equity between married and unmarried
couples. This only scratches the surface of the problem. In fact, our
tax treatment of families leads to some bizarre inconsistencies.
Consider the following story: a man and a woman are
involved in a long-term relationship, building together a complicated
1990's family. The family involves her children from a previous
marriage, children she has adopted on her own, and children they have
adopted together. Finally, the man and woman split up. The oldest of
these children, now 19, chooses to live with the father. At this point,
the nineteen-year-old is in college and the father substantially
supports her. Thus, he claims her as a dependent on his tax return.
She files her own tax return reporting her own modest income, paying
taxes at a lower marginal tax rate, which induces little disincentive to
work. It sounds like a happy story. Now, what if I tell you that their
names are Woody Allen and Soon Yi Previn. Now it's complicated.
We have three ways of viewing these two for tax purposes. First, they
can file as I have just described. Second, they can be required to file
separately as unrelated individuals. Since they are not married, they
do not have to file jointly and there is no need to file - no marriage
penalty. Finally, they may get married, in which case we tax them as
a married couple filing jointly and they face a potentially significant
marriage penalty. Now, I do not mean to make too much of this
example and, certainly, not to make fun of Mr. Allen and Ms. Previn.
Still, I hope it illustrates the difficulties we face in forging equitable
taxation when we employ a tax system that levies taxes differentially
based upon the intimate personal relationships between people.
Finally, I should note that this discussion has completely
ignored the claim that children have to the earnings of their parents.
The substantial experience we have in this country with divorce and
child support payments indicates that children, in some sense, own
some of the earnings of their parents. Divorced fathers are routinely
required to pay some of their earnings to support their children. 30 As
30 Cf 59 Am. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child §59 (1987) (requiring adjudication

and contribution of child support; further mandating that no father can release himself
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such, equitable taxation turns on the question "how much money did
an individual have claim to" or "whose money is it?" We may find
ourselves moving towards a system of separate filing, perhaps, even
something like the French system. In France, income earned by all
household members is pooled for tax purposes. It is then divided
among all family members. In the French system, children are
counted as half an adult. Recent work by Lazear and Michael, based
on United States data, has suggested
that we use a weight of .4 for a
31
child. But these are details.
Most tax policy research related to the family moves fairly
quickly from the observation that the family income can be earned by
various family members, to a discussion of problems posed by
pursuing the inconsistent goals of marriage neutrality, progressive
taxation, and horizontal equity across families with equal income.
Thus we discuss the marriage tax, labor supply, household structure
and formation and so on. At the same time, our principles of income
taxation suggest that we tax folks based on their ability to pay. In the
case of the income tax, forming an estimate of ability-to-pay must
begin with a definition of individual income and that turns on a
definition of what is the economic unit that is appropriate for taxation.
I would like to suggest that measuring and allocating income across
household members - whether the household is defined by marriage,
cohabitation, or blood relations - is an important and complicated
task that must be accomplished first in order to create an equitable and
efficient system of income taxation.
PROF. THOMAS: Thank you, Amy.
Just one comment on the Allen/Previn household, I wonder if
they would be a bonus couple rather than a penalty couple? I think,
32
she would be lucky if they were a penalty couple.
from an obligation to support merely by giving child away).
31 See EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME
WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 147-48 (1988) (observing that an adult spends $100 on himself
for every $40 he spends on a child, indicating an income allocation ratio of $100 to $40,
or I to .4, suggesting that .4 represent a child for income tax purposes).
32If both spouses earn at least one-third of their combined income, they are
likely to incur a marriage penalty. Thus if one spouse had an adjusted gross income of
$1million in a given year, the other spouse would have to have at least $500,000 in
adjusted gross income for the couple to experience the marriage penalty effect. If one
spouse contributes less than one-third of aggregate income, filing a joint return generally

